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Abstract
Following Fisher, it is widely believed that randomization “relieves the experimenter
from the anxiety of considering innumerable causes by which the data may be dis-
turbed.” In particular, it is said to control for known and unknown nuisance factors
that may considerably challenge the validity of a result. Looking for quantitative ad-
vice, we study a number of straightforward, mathematically simple models. However,
they all demonstrate that the optimism with respect to randomization is wishful think-
ing rather than based on fact. In small to medium-sized samples, random allocation of
units to treatments typically yields a considerable imbalance between the groups, i.e.,
confounding due to randomization is the rule rather than the exception.
In the second part of this contribution, we extend the reasoning to a number of tradi-
tional arguments for and against randomization. This discussion is rather non-technical,
and at times even “foundational” (Frequentist vs. Bayesian). However, its result turns
out to be quite similar. While randomization’s contribution remains questionable, com-
parability contributes much to a compelling conclusion. Summing up, classical exper-
imentation based on sound background theory and the systematic construction of ex-
changeable groups seems to be advisable.
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1 The Logic of the Experiment
Randomization, the allocation of subjects to experimental conditions via a random pro-
cedure, was introduced by R.A. Fisher (1935). Arguably, it has since become the most
important statistical technique. In particular, statistical experiments are defined by the
use of randomization (Rosenbaum 2002, Shadish et al. 2002), and many applied fields,
such as evidence based medicine, draw a basic distinction between randomized and
non-randomized evidence (e.g. the Oxford Centre for Evidence-based Medicine 2009).
In order to explain randomization’s eminent role, one needs to refer to the logic of the
experiment, largely based on J. S. Mill’s (1843: 225) method of difference:
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an
instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common
save one, that one occurring only in the former: the circumstance in which
alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of
the cause, of the phenomenon.
Therefore, if one compares two groups of subjects (Treatment T versus Control C, say)
and observes a substantial difference in the end (e.g. X¯T > X¯C), that difference must
be due to the experimental manipulation - IF the groups were equivalent at the very
beginning of the experiment. In other words, since the difference between treatment
and control (i.e. the experimental manipulation) is the only perceivable reason that
can explain the variation in the observations, it must be the cause of the observed
effect (the difference in the end). The situation is quite altered, however, if the two
groups already differed substantially at the beginning. Then, there are two possible
explanations of an effect:
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Start of Experiment T = C T 6= C
Intervention Yes No Yes No
End of Experiment
(Observed Effect) X¯T > X¯C X¯T > X¯C
Conclusion Intervention Intervention OR Prior Difference
caused the effect between the groups caused the effect
2 Comparability
Thus, for the logic of the experiment, it is of paramount importance to ensure equiv-
alence of the groups at the beginning of the experiment. The groups, or even the in-
dividuals involved, must not be systematically different; one has to compare like with
like. Alas, in the social sciences exact equality of units, e.g. human individuals, cannot
be maintained. Therefore one must settle for comparable subjects or groups (T ≈ C).
In practice, it is straightforward to define comparability with respect to the features or
properties of the experimental units involved. In a typical experimental setup, statis-
tical units (e.g. persons) are represented by their corresponding vectors of attributes
(properties, variables) such as gender, body height, age, etc.:
Unit No. Gender Height Marital status Age Income . . . Attribute j
1 f (1) 170cm married (1) 34 £50000 . . . a1j
2 m (2) 188cm divorced (2) 44 £70000 . . . a2j
3 m (2) 169cm single (0) 44 £35000 . . . a3j
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i ai1 ai2 ai3 ai4 ai5 . . . aij
If the units are almost equal in as many properties as possible, they should be com-
parable, i.e., the remaining differences shouldn’t alter the experimental outcome sub-
stantially. However, since, in general, vectors have to be compared, there is not a single
measure of similarity. Rather, there are quite a lot of measures available, depending on
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the kind of data at hand. An easily accessible and rather comprehensive overview may
be found in
reference.wolfram.com/mathematica/guide/DistanceAndSimilarityMeasures.html
As an example, suppose a unit i is represented by a binary vector ai = (ai1, . . . , aim).
The Hamming distance d(·, ·) between two such vectors is the number of positions at
which the corresponding symbols are different. In other words, it is the minimum num-
ber of substitutions required to change one vector into the other. Let a1 = (0, 0, 1, 0),
a2 = (1, 1, 1, 0), and a3 = (1, 1, 1, 1). Therefore d(a1, a2) = 2, d(a1, a3) = 3, d(a2, a3) =
1, and d(ai, ai) = 0. Having thus calculated a reasonable number for the “closeness” of
two experimental units, one next has to consider what level of deviance from perfect
equality may be tolerable.
Due to the reasons outlined above, coping with similarities is a tricky business. Typ-
ically many properties (covariates) are involved and conscious (subjective) judgement
seems to be inevitable. That might at least partially explain why matching on the
(rather objective) scalar valued propensity score, which is the probability of being as-
signed to T given a set of observed properties, has become popular recently (Rubin
2006).
An even more serious question concerns the fact that relevant factors may not have
been recorded or might be totally unknown. In the worst case, similarity with respect to
some known factors has been checked, but an unnoticed nuisance variable is responsible
for the difference between the outcome in the two groups.
Moreover, comparability depends on the phenomenon studied. A clearly visible dif-
ference, such as gender, is likely to be important with respect to life expectancy, and
can influence some physiological and psychological variables such as height or social
behaviour, but it is independent of skin color or blood type. In other words, experi-
mental units do not need to be twins in any respect; it suffices that they be similar
with respect to the outcome variable under study.
Given a unique sample it is easy to think about a reference set of other samples that
are alike in all relevant respects to the one observed. However, even Fisher failed to give
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these words a precise formal meaning (see Johnstone 1988). Nowadays, epidemiologists
use the term ‘unconfounded’ in order to communicate the same idea: “[. . .] the effect of
treatment is unconfounded if the treated and untreated groups resemble each other in
all relevant features” (Pearl 2009: 196). Pearl shows that this problem is tightly linked
to Simpson’s famous paradox (Simpson 1951) and devotes a major part of his book
to the development of a formal calculus that is able to cope with it. Another major
advance was the idea of exchangeability, a concept proposed by de Finetti (1974):
[. . .] instead of judging whether two groups are similar, the investigator
is instructed to imagine a hypothetical exchange of the two groups (the
treated group becomes untreated, and vice versa) and then judge whether
the observed data under the swap would be distinguishable from the actual
data. (Pearl 2009: 196)
Barnard (1993) gives some history on this idea and suggests the term ‘permutability’
instead, “which conveys the idea of replacing one thing by another similar thing.”
3 Experimental Techniques to Achieve Compara-
bility
There are a number of strategies to achieve comparability. Starting with the experi-
mental units, it is straightforward to match similar individuals, i.e., to construct pairs
of individuals that are alike in many (most) respects. Boring (1953: 583) says:
You may match them individual for individual in respect to what seems to
be their most important determinable and presumably relevant character-
istics [. . .] You can match litter-mates in body-weight if your subjects are
animals, and you can advertise for twins when your subjects are human.
An example could be
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Gender Height Martial status Age Income Academic
T1 1 170 1 34 50000 1 (yes)
C1 1 165 1 30 55000 1 (yes)
T2 2 193 2 46 72000 0 (no)
C2 2 188 2 44 70000 1 (yes)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Looking at the group level (T and C), another obvious strategy is to balance all relevant
variables when assigning units to groups. Many approaches of this kind are discussed
in Senn (2000: 140), minimization being the most prominent among them (Taves 1974,
Treasure and MacRae 1998), as the latter authors explain:
In our study of aspirin versus placebo [. . .] we chose age, sex, operating
surgeon, number of coronary arteries affected, and left ventricular function.
But in trials in other diseases those chosen might be tumour type, disease
stage, joint mobility, pain score, or social class.
At the point when it is decided that a patient is definitely to enter a trial,
these factors are listed. The treatment allocation is then made, not purely
by chance, but by determining in which group inclusion of the patient would
minimise any differences in these factors. Thus, if group A has a higher
average age and a disproportionate number of smokers, other things being
equal, the next elderly smoker is likely to be allocated to group B. The
allocation may rely on minimisation alone, or still involve chance but “with
the dice loaded” in favour of the allocation which minimises the differences.
However, apart from being cumbersome and relying on the experimenter’s expertise (in
particular in choosing and weighing the factors), these strategies are always open to the
criticism that unknown nuisance variables may have had a substantial impact on the
result. Therefore Fisher (1935: 18f) advised strongly against treating every conceivable
factor explicitly:
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[. . .] it would be impossible to present an exhaustive list of such possible
differences appropriate to any kind of experiment, because the uncontrolled
causes which may influence the result are always strictly innumerable [. . .]
whatever degree of care and experimental skill is expended in equalising
the conditions, other than the one under test, which are liable to affect
the result, this equalisation must always be to a greater or less extent
incomplete, and in many important practical cases will certainly be grossly
defective.
Instead, he made the best of it and put forward his arguably most famous contribution:
The full procedure of randomization [is the method] by which the validity
of the test of significance may be guaranteed against corruption by the
causes of disturbance which have not been eliminated [. . .] the random
choice of the objects to be treated in different ways [is] a complete guarantee
of the validity of the test of significance [. . .Randomization] relieves the
experimenter from the anxiety of considering and estimating the magnitude
of the innumerable causes by which the data may be disturbed. (Fisher
1935: 19, 20, 44)
Consequently, “randomization controls for all possible confounders, known and un-
known” became a common slogan. Treasure and MacRae (1998) explain: “The primary
objective of randomisation is to ensure that all other factors that might influence the
outcome will be equally represented in the two groups, leaving the treatment under
test as the only dissimilarity.” In the same vein Berger (2005: 9f) says:
The idea of randomization is to overlay a sequence of units (subjects, or
patients) onto a sequence of treatment conditions. If neither sequence can
influence the other, then there should be no bias in the assignment of the
treatments, and the comparison groups should be comparable.
In other words, the weight of evidence of a statistical experiment crucially depends
on how well the tool of randomization achieves its ultimate goal: comparability. Non-
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comparable groups offer a straightforward alternative explanation, undermining the
logic of the experiment. Thus the common term randomized evidence is a misnomer, if
randomization fails to reliably yield comparable groups.
4 Randomization and Comparability
Historically, Fisher’s idea proved to be a great success. Hacking (1988: 427) states:
“Indeed randomization is so commonplace that anyone untroubled by the fundamen-
tal principles of statistics must suppose that the practice is quite uncontroversial.”
Nevertheless, quite a few scientists have argued that randomization does not work as
advertised. They concluded:
(i) Altman (1985: 125): “Randomised allocation in a clinical trial does not guarantee
that the treatment groups are comparable with respect to baseline characteris-
tics.”
(ii) Urbach (1985: 266): “It is a chilling thought that medical treatments that are
worthless may have been endorsed, and valuable ones discarded, after randomized
trials in which the treatment groups differed in ways that were known to be
relevant to the disease under study, but where the strict rules of randomization
were applied and no adjustment made.”
(iii) Treasure and MacRae (1998): “Indeed, if there are many possible prognostic fac-
tors there will almost certainly be differences between the groups despite the use
of random allocation. In a small clinical trial a large treatment effect is being
sought, but a large difference in one or more of the prognostic factors can occur
purely by chance. In a large clinical trial a small treatment effect is being sought,
but small but important differences between the groups in one or more of the
prognostic factors can occur by chance. [. . .] At this point the primary objective
of randomisation — exclusion of confounding factors — has failed.”
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(iv) Greenland et al. (1999: 35): [. . .] random imbalances may be severe, especially if
the study size is small [. . .]
(v) Rosenbaum (2002: 21): “The statement that randomization tends to balance co-
variates is at best imprecise; taken too literally, it is misleading [. . .] What is
precisely true is that random assignment of treatments can produce some im-
balances by chance, but common statistical methods, properly used, suffice to
address the uncertainty introduced by these chance imbalances.”
(vi) Berger (2005: 9): “While it is certainly true that randomization is used for the
purpose of ensuring comparability between or among comparison groups, we will
see [. . .] that it is categorically not true that this goal is achieved.” [See also his
figure (p. 32) entitled: “Random Imbalance, No Selection Bias.”]
(vii) Box et al. (2005: 94): “Even with randomization the assumption of exchangeabil-
ity can be violated.”
(viii) Howson and Urbach (2006: 259): “[. . .] the chief concern when designing a clinical
trial should be to make it unlikely that the experimental groups differ on factors
that are likely to affect the outcome [. . .] With this rule in mind, it is evident that
a randomized allocation of subjects to treatments might sometimes be useful
in clinical trials as a way of better balancing the experimental groups [. . .] But
randomized allocation is not absolutely necessary; it is no sine qua non; it is not
the only or even always the best way of constructing the treatment groups in a
clinical trial” (emphasis in the original).
(ix) Worrall (2007: 465): “It is entirely possible that any particular randomization may
have produced a division into experimental and control groups that is unbalanced
with respect to ‘unknown’ factor X [. . .]”
(x) Austin (2008: 2039): “While randomization will, on average, balance covariates
between treated and untreated subjects, it need not do so in any particular ran-
domization.”
10
(xi) Chu et al. (2012): “Despite randomization, imbalance in prognostic factors as a
result of chance (chance imbalance) may still arise, and with small to moderate
sample sizes such imbalance may be substantial.”
Moreover, quite early, statisticians - in particular of the Bayesian persuasion - put
forward several rather diverse arguments against randomization (Savage 1962, 1976,
Rubin 1978, Basu 1980, Lindley 1982, Basu 1988, Kadane and Seidenfeld 1990). The
latter authors discuss the role of “randomized designs as methodological insurance
against a ‘biased’ sample”. They conclude:
What is it concerning randomization that makes such a judgement (of ir-
relevance of the allocation to the test outcomes) compelling for the reader?
We can find none and suspect that randomization has little to do with
whatever grounds there are for the belief that the allocation is irrelevant to
the test results. (Kadane and Seidenfeld 1990: 335f)
Fortunately, it is not necessary at this point to delve into delicate philosophical mat-
ters or the rather violent Bayesian-Frequentist debate (however, see Section 7). Fairly
elementary probabilistic arguments suffice to demonstrate that the above criticism hits
its target: By its very nature a random mechanism provokes fluctuations in the compo-
sition of T and C, making these groups (rather often) non-comparable. Therefore the
subsequent argument has the advantage of being straightforward, mathematical, and
not primarily “foundational”. Its flavour is Bayesian in the sense that we are comparing
the actual groups produced by randomization which is the “posterior view” preferred
by that school. At the same time its flavour is Frequentist, since we are focusing on
the properties of a certain random procedure which is the “design view” preferred by
this school.
There are not just two, but (at least) three, competing statistical philosophies: “In
many ways the Bayesian and frequentist philosophies stand at opposite poles from each
other, with Fisher’s ideas being somewhat of a compromise” (Efron 1998: 98). Since
randomization is a Fisherian proposal, a neutral quantitative analysis of his approach
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seems to be appropriate, acceptable to all schools, and, in a sense, long overdue. Down-
to-earth physicist Jaynes (2003: xxii) explains:
One can argue with philosophy; it is not easy to argue with a computer
printout, which says to us: ‘Independently of all your philosophy, here are
the facts of actual performance.’
To this end we resume our reasoning with a simple but striking example:
Greenland’s example
Greenland (1990: 422) came up with “[. . .] the smallest possible controlled trial [. . .] to
illustrate one thing randomization does not do: It does not prevent the epidemiologic
bias known as confounding [. . .]”(emphasis in the original; for a related example involv-
ing an interaction see p. 17). That is, he flips a coin once in order to assign two patients
to T and C, respectively: If heads, the first patient is assigned to T , and the second to
C; if tails, the first patient is assigned to C, and the second to T . Suppose X¯T > X¯C ,
what is the reason for the observed effect? Due to the experimental design, there are
two alternatives: either the treatment condition differed from the control condition, or
patient P1 was not comparable to patient P2.
P1 P2 Start of Experiment P2 P1
Yes No Intervention Yes No
X¯T > X¯C End of Experiment X¯T > X¯C
However, as each patient is only observed under either the treatment or control (the
left hand side or the right hand side of the above table), one cannot distinguish between
the patient’s and the treatment’s impact on the observed result. Therefore Greenland
concludes:
No matter what the outcome of randomization, the study will be completely
confounded.
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Suppose the patients are perfect twins with the exception of a single difference. Then
Greenland’s example shows that randomization cannot even balance a single nuisance
factor. To remedy the defect, it is straightforward to increase n. But how large an
n will assure comparability? Like many authors, Greenland states the basic result in
a qualitative manner: “Using randomization, one can make the probability of severe
confounding as small as one likes by increasing the size of the treatment cohorts”
(Greenland 1990: 423). However, no quantitative advice is given here or elsewhere.
Thus it should be worthwhile studying a number of explicit and straightforward models,
quantifying the effects of randomization.
5 Random Confounding
5.1 Dichotomous factors
Suppose there is a nuisance factor X taking the value 1 if present and 0 if absent. One
may think of X as a genetic aberration, a medical condition, a psychological disposition
or a social habit. Assume that the factor occurs with probability p in a certain person
(independent of anything else). Given this, 2n persons are randomized into two groups
of equal size by a chance mechanism independent of X .
Let S1 and S2 count the number of persons with the trait in the first and the second
group respectively. S1 and S2 are independent random variables, each having a binomial
distribution with parameters n and p. A natural way to measure the extent of imbalance
between the groups is D = S1 − S2. Obviously, ED = 0 and
σ2(D) = σ2(S1) + σ
2(−S2) = 2σ2(S1) = 2np(1− p).
Iff D = 0, the two groups are perfectly balanced with respect to factor X . In the
worst case |D| = n, that is, in one group all units possess the characteristic, whereas
it is completely absent in the other. For fixed n, let the two groups be comparable if
|D| ≤ n/i with some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Iff i = 1, the groups will always be considered
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comparable. However, the larger i, the smaller the number of cases we classify as
comparable. In general, n/i defines a proportion of the range of |D| that seems to
be acceptable. Since n/i is a positive number, and S1 = S2 ⇔ |D| = 0, the set of
comparable groups is never empty.
Given some constant i(< n), the value n/i grows at a linear rate in n, whereas σ(D) =√
2np(1− p) grows much more slowly. Due to continuity, there is a single point n(i, k),
where the line intersects with k times the standard deviation of D. Beyond this point,
i.e. for all n ≥ n(i, k), at least as many realizations of |D| will be within the acceptable
range [0, n/i]. Straightforward algebra gives,
np(i, k) = 2p(1− p)i2k2.
Examples
A typical choice could be i = 10 and k = 3, which specifies the requirement that most
samples be located within a rather tight acceptable range. In this case, one has to
consider the functions n/10 and 3
√
2p(1− p)n. These functions of n are shown in the
following graph:
100 200 300 400 500
n
10
20
30
40
50
Illustration: The linear function n/10, and 3
√
2p(1− p)n for p = 1/2, p = 1/5, p =
1/10, and p = 1/100 (from above to below).
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Thus, depending on p, the following numbers of subjects are needed per group (and
twice this number altogether):
p i k np(i, k) 2 · np(i, k)
1/2 10 3 450 900
1/5 10 3 288 576
1/10 10 3 162 324
1/100 10 3 18 36
Relaxing the criterion of comparability (i.e. a smaller value of i) decreases the number
of subjects necessary:
p i k np(i, k)
1/2 5 3 113
1/5 5 3 72
1/10 5 3 41
1/100 5 3 5
The same happens if one decreases the number of standard deviations k:
p i k np(i, k)
1/2 10 2 200
1/5 10 2 128
1/10 10 2 72
1/100 10 2 8
This shows that randomization works, if the number of subjects ranges in the hundreds
or if the probability p is rather low. (By symmetry, the same conclusion holds if p is
close to one.) Otherwise there is hardly any guarantee that the two groups will be
comparable. Rather, they will differ considerably due to random fluctuations.
The distribution of D is well known (e.g. Johnson et al. 2005: 142f). For d = −n, . . . , n,
P (D = d) =
∑
max(0,d)≤y≤min(n,n+d)
(
n
y
)(
n
y − d
)
p2y−d(1− p)2n−2y+d
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Therefore, it is also possible to compute the probability q = q(i, n, p) that two groups,
constructed by randomization, will be comparable. If i = 5, i.e., if one fifth of the range
of |D| is judged to be comparable, we obtain:
p n q(i, n, p)
1/2 5 0.66
1/2 10 0.74
1/2 25 0.88
1/2 50 0.96
p n q(i, n, p)
1/10 5 0.898
1/10 10 0.94
1/10 25 0.98999
1/10 50 0.999
p n q(i, n, p)
1/100 5 0.998
1/100 10 0.9997
1/100 25 0.999999
1/100 50 1
Thus, it is rather difficult to control a factor that has a probability of about 1/2 in
the population. However, even if the probability of occurrence is only about 1/10, one
needs more than 25 people per group to have reasonable confidence that the factor has
not produced a substantial imbalance.
Several factors
The situation becomes worse if one takes more than one nuisance factor into account.
Given m independent binary factors, each of them occurring with probability p, the
probability that the groups will be balanced with respect to all nuisance variables is
qm. Numerically, the above results yield:
p n q q2 q5 q10
1/2 5 0.66 0.43 0.12 0.015
1/2 10 0.74 0.54 0.217 0.047
1/2 25 0.88 0.78 0.53 0.28
1/2 50 0.96 0.93 0.84 0.699
p n q q2 q5 q10
1/10 5 0.898 0.807 0.58 0.34
1/10 10 0.94 0.88 0.74 0.54
1/10 25 0.98999 0.98 0.95 0.90
1/10 50 0.999 0.9989 0.997 0.995
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p n q q2 q5 q10
1/100 5 0.998 0.996 0.99 0.98
1/100 10 0.9998 0.9996 0.999 0.9979
1/100 25 0.9999998 0.9999995 0.999999 0.999998
1/100 50 1 1 1 1
Accordingly, given m independent binary factors, each occurring with probability pj
(and corresponding qj = q(i, n, pj)), the probabilities closest to 1/2 will dominate
1 − q1 · · · qm, which is the probability that the two groups are not comparable due to
an imbalance in at least one variable. In a typical study with 2n = 100 persons, for
example, it does not matter if there are one, two, five or even ten factors, if each of them
occurs with probability of 1/100. However, if some of the factors are rather common
(e.g. 1/5 < pj < 4/5), this changes considerably. In a smaller study with fewer than
2n = 50 participants, a few such factors suffice to increase the probability that the
groups constructed by randomization won’t be comparable to 50%. With only a few
units per group, one can be reasonably sure that some undetected, but rather common,
nuisance factor(s) will make the groups non-comparable.
The situation deteriorates considerably if there are interactions between the variables
that may yield convincing alternative explanations for an observed effect. It is possible
that all factors considered in isolation are reasonably balanced (which is often checked
in practice), but that a certain combination of them affects the observed treatment
effect. For the purpose of illustration suppose four persons (being young or old, and
male or female) are investigated:
T C
Old Man Old Woman
Young Woman Young Man
Although gender and (dichotomized) age are perfectly balanced between T and C, the
young woman has been allocated to the first group. Therefore a property of young
17
women (e.g. pregnancy) may serve as an explanation for an observed effect, e.g. X¯T >
X¯C .
Given m factors, there arem(m−1)/2 possible interactions between just two of the fac-
tors, and
(
m
ν
)
possible interactions between ν of them. Thus, there is a high probability
that some considerable imbalance occurs in at least one of these numerous interactions,
in small groups in particular. For a striking early numerical study see Lee et al. (1980).
Detected or undetected, such imbalances provide excellent alternative explanations of
an observed effect. Altogether our conclusion based on an explicit quantitative analysis
coincides with the qualitative argument given by Savage (1962: 91):
Suppose we had, say, thirty fur-bearing animals of which some were junior
and some senior, some black and some brown, some fat and some thin, some
of one variety and some of another, some born wild and some in captivity,
some sluggish and some energetic, and some long-haired and some short-
haired. It might be hard to base a convincing assay of a pelt-conditioning
vitamin on an experiment with these animals, for every subset of fifteen
might well contain nearly all of the animals from one side or another of one
of the important dichotomies [. . .]
Thus contrary to what I think I was taught, and certainly used to believe,
it does not seem possible to base a meaningful experiment on a small het-
erogenous group.
In the light of this, one can only hope for some ‘benign’ dependence structure among
the factors, i.e., a reasonable balance in one factor improving the balance in (some
of) the others. Given such a tendency, a larger number of nuisance factors may be
controlled, since it suffices to focus on only a few. Independent variables possess a
‘neutral’ dependence structure in that the balance in one factor does not influence
the balance in others. Yet, there may be a ‘malign’ dependence structure, such that
balancing one factor tends to actuate imbalances in others.
18
We will make this argument more precise in Section 6. However, a concrete example will
illustrate the idea: Given a benign dependence structure, catching one cow (balancing
one factor) makes it easier to catch others. Therefore it is easy to lead a herd into an
enclosure: Grab some of the animals by their horns (balance some of the factors) and
the others will follow. However, in the case of a malign dependence structure the same
procedure tends to stir up the animals, i.e., the more cows are caught (the more factors
are being balanced), the less controllable the remaining herd becomes.
5.2 Ordered random variables
In order to show that our conclusions do not depend on some specific model, let us
next consider ordered random variables. To begin with, look at four units with ranks
1 to 4. If they are split into two groups of equal size, such that the best (1) and the
worst (4) are in one group, and (2) and (3) are in the other, both groups have the same
rank sum and are thus comparable. However, if the best and the second best constitute
one group and the third and the fourth the other group, their rank sums (3 versus 7)
differ by the maximum amount possible, and they do not seem to be comparable. If
the units with ranks 1 and 3 are in the first group and the units with ranks 2 and 4
are in the second one, the difference in rank sums is |6 − 4| = 2 and it seems to be a
matter of personal judgement whether or not one thinks of them as comparable.
Given two groups, each having n members, the total sum of ranks is r = 2n(2n+1)/2 =
n(2n+1). If, in total analogy to the last section, S1 and S2 are the sum of the ranks in
the first and the second group, respectively, S2 = r−S1. Therefore it suffices to consider
S1, which is the test statistic of Wilcoxon’s test. Again, a natural way to measure the
extent of imbalance between the groups is D = S1−S2 = 2S1− r. Like before ED = 0
and because σ2(S1) = n
2(2n+ 1)/12 we have σ2(D) = 4σ2(S1) = n
2(2n+ 1)/3.
Moreover, n(n + 1)/2 ≤ Sj ≤ n(3n + 1)/2 (j = 1, 2) yields −n2 ≤ D ≤ n2. Thus, in
this case, n2/i (i ∈ {1, . . . , n2}) determines a proportion of the range of |D| that may
be used to define comparability. Given a fixed i(< n2), the quantity n2/i is growing at
a quadratic rate in n, whereas σ(D) = n
√
(2n+ 1)/3 is growing at a slower pace. Like
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before, there is a single point n(i, k), where n2/i = kσ(D). Straightforward algebra
gives,
n(i, k) = ik(ik +
√
(ik)2 + 3)/3.
Again, we see that large numbers of observations are needed to ensure comparability:
i k n(i, k)
10 3 501
5 3 156
10 2 267
Again, it is possible to work with the distribution of D explicitly. That is, given i
and n, one may calculate the probability q = q(i, n) that two groups, constructed by
randomization, are comparable. If |D| ≤ n2/i is considered comparable, it is possible
to obtain, using the function pwilcox() in R:
n
i 5 10 25 50 100
3 0.58 0.78 0.96 0.996 1
5 0.45 0.56 0.78 0.92 0.99
10 0.16 0.32 0.45 0.61 0.78
These results for ordered random variables are perfectly in line with the conclusions
drawn from the binary model. Moreover, the same argument as before shows that the
situation becomes (considerably) worse if several factors may influence the final result.
5.3 A continuous model
Finally, I consider a continuous model. Suppose there is just one factor X ∼ N(µ, σ).
One may think of X as a normally distributed personal ability, person i having indi-
vidual ability xi. As before, assume that 2n persons are randomized into two groups of
equal size by a chance mechanism independent of the persons’ abilities.
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Suppose that also in this model S1 and S2 measure the total amount of ability in the
first and the second group respectively. Obviously, S1 and S2 are independent random
variables, each having a normal distribution N(nµ,
√
nσ). A straightforward way to
measure the absolute extent of imbalance between the groups is
D = S1 − S2 =
n∑
ι=1
X1,ι −
n∑
ι=1
X2,ι =
n∑
ι=1
(X1,ι −X2,ι). (1)
Due to independence, obviously D ∼ N(0,√2nσ).
Let the two groups be comparable if |D| ≤ lσ, i.e., if the difference between the abil-
ities assembled in the two groups does not differ by more than l standard deviations
of the ability X in a single unit. The larger l, the more cases are classified as com-
parable. For every fixed l, lσ is a constant, whereas σ(D) =
√
2nσ is growing slowly.
Owing to continuity, there is yet another single point n(l), where lσ = σ(D) =
√
2nσ.
Straightforward algebra gives,
l ≤
√
2n⇔ 2n ≥ l2.
In particular, we have:
l 1 2 3 5 10
n 1 2 5 13 50
In other words, the two groups become non-comparable very quickly. It is almost
impossible that two groups of 500 persons each, for example, could be close to one
another with respect to total (absolute) ability.
However, one may doubt if this measure of non-comparability really makes sense. Given
two teams with a hundred or more subjects, it does not seem to matter whether the
total ability in the first one is within a few standard deviations of the other. Therefore
it is reasonable to look at the relative advantage of group 1 with respect to group 2,
i.e. Q = D/n. Why divide by n and not by some other function of n? First, due to
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equation (1), exactly n comparisons X1,ι −X2,ι have to be made. Second, since
Q =
n∑
ι=1
X1,ι/n−
n∑
ι=1
X2,ι/n = X¯T − X¯C ,
Q may be interpreted in a natural way, i.e., being the difference between the typical
(mean) representative of group 1 (treatment) and the typical representative of group
2 (control). A straightforward calculation yields Q ∼ N(0, σ
√
2/n).
Let the two groups be comparable if |Q| ≤ lσ. If one wants to be reasonably sure
(three standard deviations of Q) that comparability holds, we have lσ ≥ 3σ√2/n ⇔
n ≥ 18/l2. Thus, at least the following numbers of subjects are required per group:
l 5 2 1 1/2 1/4 1/8
n 1 5 18 72 288 1152
If one standard deviation is considered a large effect (Cohen 1988), three dozen subjects
are needed to ensure that such an effect will not be produced by chance. To avoid a
small difference between the groups due to randomization (one quarter of a standard
deviation, say), the number of subjects needed goes into the hundreds.
In general, if k standard deviations of Q are desired, we have,
n ≥ 2k2/l2.
Thus, for k = 1, 2 and 5, the following numbers of subjects nk are required in each
group:
l 5 2 1 1/2 1/4 1/8
n1 1 1 2 8 32 128
n2 1 2 8 32 128 512
n5 2 13 50 200 800 3200
These are just the results for one factor. As before, the situation deteriorates consid-
erably if one sets out to control several nuisance variables by means of randomization.
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6 Intermediate Conclusions
The above models have deliberately been kept as simple as possible. Their results
are straightforward and they agree: If n is small, it is almost impossible to control
for a trait that occurs frequently at the individual level, or for a larger number of
confounders, via randomization. It is of paramount importance to understand that
random fluctuations lead to considerable differences between small or medium-sized
groups, making them very often non-comparable, thus undermining the basic logic of
experimentation. That is, ‘blind’ randomization does not create equivalent groups, but
rather provokes imbalances and subsequent artifacts: Even in larger samples one needs
considerable luck to succeed in creating equivalent groups; p close to 0 or 1, a small
number of nuisance factors m, or a favourable dependence structure that balances
all factors, including their relevant interactions, if only some crucial factors are to be
balanced by chance.
“Had the trial not used random assignment, had it instead assigned patients one at a
time to balance [some] covariates, then the balance might well have been better [for
those covariates], but there would be no basis for expecting other unmeasured variables
to be similarly balanced” (Rosenbaum 2002: 21) seems to be the only argument left in
favour of randomization. Since randomization treats known and unknown factors alike,
it is quite an asset that one may thus infer from the observed to the unobserved without
further assumptions. However, this argument backfires immediately since, for exactly
the same reason, an imbalance in an observed variable cannot be judged as harmless.
Quite the contrary: An observed imbalance hints at further undetectable imbalances
in unobserved variables.
Moreover, treating known and unknown factors equivalently is cold comfort compared
to the considerable amount of imbalance evoked by randomization. Fisher’s favourite
method always comes with the cost that it introduces additional variability, whereas
a systematic schema at least balances known factors. In subject areas haunted by
heterogeneity it seems intuitively right to deliberately work in favour of comparability,
and rather odd to introduce further variability.
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Three types of dependence structures
In order to sharpen these arguments, let us look at an observed factorX , an unobserved
factor Y , and their dependence structure in more detail. Without loss of generality
let all functions d(·) be positive in the following. Having constructed two groups of
equal size via randomization, suppose dR(X) = X¯T −X¯C > 0 is the observed difference
between the groups with respect to variable X . Using a systematic scheme instead, i.e.,
distributing the units among T and C in a more balanced way, this may be reduced
to dS(X). The crucial question is how such a manipulation affects dR(Y ), the balance
between the groups with respect to another variable.
A benign dependence structure may be characterized by dS(Y ) < dR(Y ). In other
words, the effort of balancing X pays off, since the increased comparability in this
variable carries over to Y . For example, given today’s occupational structures with
women earning considerably less than men, balancing for gender should also even out
differences in income. If balancing in X has no effect on Y , dS(Y ) ≈ dR(Y ), no harm
is done. For example, balancing for gender should not affect the distribution of blood
type in the observed groups, since blood type is independent of gender. Only in the
pathological case when increasing the balance in X has the opposite effect on Y , one
may face troubles. As an example, let there be four pairs (x1, y1) = (1, 4); (x2, y2) =
(2, 2); (x3, y3) = (3, 1); and (x4, y4) = (4, 3). Putting units 1 and 4 in one group, and
units 2 and 3 in another, yields a perfect balance in the first variable, but the worst
imbalance possible in the second.
However, suppose d(·) < c where the constant (threshold) c defines comparability.
Then, in the randomized case, the groups are comparable if both dR(X) and dR(Y ) are
smaller than c. By construction, dS(X) ≤ dR(X) < c, i.e., the systematically composed
groups are also comparable with respect to X . Given a malign dependence structure,
dS(Y ) increases. Yet dS(Y ) < c may still hold, since, in this case, the “safety margin”
c − dR(Y ) may prevent the systematically constructed groups from becoming non-
comparable with respect to property Y . In large samples, c− dR(·) is considerable for
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both variables. Therefore, in most cases, consciously constructed samples will (still) be
comparable. Moreover, the whole argument easily extends to more than two factors.
In a nutshell, endeavouring to balance relevant variables pays off. A conscious balancing
schema equates known factors better than chance and may have some positive effect on
related, but unknown, variables. If the balancing schema has no effect on an unknown
factor, the latter is treated as if randomization were interfering - i.e. in a completely
nonsystematic, ‘neutral’ way. Only if there is a (very) malign dependence structure,
when systematically balancing some variable provokes (considerable) “collateral dam-
age”, might randomization be preferable.
This is where sample size comes in. In realistic situations with many unknown nui-
sance factors, randomization only works if n is (really) large. Yet if n is large, so are
the “safety margins” in the variables, and even an unfortunate dependence structure
won’t do any harm. If n is smaller, the above models show that systematic efforts,
rather than randomization, may yield comparability. Given a small number of units,
both approaches only have a chance of succeeding if there are hardly any unknown
nuisance factors, or if there is a benign dependence structure, i.e., if a balance in some
variable (no matter how achieved) has a positive effect on others. In particular, if the
number of relevant nuisance factors and interactions is small, it pays to isolate and
control for a handful of obviously influential variables, which is a crucial ingredient of
experimentation in the classical natural sciences. Our overall conclusion may thus be
summarized in the following table:
Dependence structure X (observed) Y (unobserved) Preferable procedure
Benign dS(X) < dR(X) dS(Y ) < dR(Y ) Systematic allocation
Neutral dS(X) < dR(X) dS(Y ) ≈ dR(Y ) Systematic allocation
Malign dS(X) < dR(X) dS(Y ) > dR(Y ) Rather systematic than
random allocation
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7 The Frequentist Position
There is yet another important, some would say outstanding, defense of randomization
that we have omitted so far. According to this point of view the major “[. . .] function of
randomization is to generate the sample space and hence provide the basis for estimates
of error and tests of significance [. . .]” (Cornfield 1976: 419). In a statistical experiment
one controls the random mechanism, thus the experimenter knows the sample space and
the distribution in question. This constructed and therefore “valid” framework keeps
nuisance variables at bay and sound reasoning within the framework leads to correct
results. Someone following this train of thought could therefore state - and several
referees of this contribution indeed did so - that the above models underline the rather
well-known fact that randomization can have difficulties in constructing similar groups
(achieving exchangeablility/comparability, balancing covariates), in particular if n is
small. However, this goal is quite subordinate to the major goal of establishing a known
distribution on which sound statistical conclusions can be based.
The latter view has been proposed and defended by Frequentist statisticians, in par-
ticular Fisher and Neyman. It once dominated the field of statistics and still has a
stronghold in certain quarters, in particular medical statistics where randomized con-
trolled trials have been the gold standard. In this section, we focus on the basic Fre-
quentist viewpoint and some its major criticisms. Given this, several perspectives on
randomization will be the thrust of the next section. Section 9 then provides the link
to causation and Section 10 gives a wider, historical perspective.
Traditionally, criticism of the Frequentist line of argument in general, and randomiza-
tion in particular, has come from the Bayesian school of statistics. While Frequentist
statistics is much concerned with the way data is collected, focusing on the design
of experiments, the corresponding sample space and sampling distribution, Bayesian
statistics is rather concerned with the data actually obtained. Its focus is on learning
from the(se) data - in particular with the help of Bayes’ theorem - and the parameter
space.
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In a sense, both viewpoints are perfectly natural and not contradicting each other, so
it may seem futile to decide which emphasis is more appropriate. However, the ex-
ample of randomization shows that this cannot be the final word: For the pre-data
view, randomization is essential, it constitutes the difference between a real statisti-
cal experiment and any kind of quasi-experiment. For the post-data view, however,
randomization adds nothing to the information at hand, and is ancilliary or just a
nuisance.
Consistently, Freedman (2008a: 238), an outstanding Frequentist, says a bit more gen-
erally that there are “two styles of inference.
• Randomization provides a known distribution for the assignment variables; sta-
tistical inferences are based on this distribution.
• Modeling assumes a distribution for the latent variables; statistical inferences are
based on that assumption.” (Emphasis added)
Yet Jaynes (2003), an outstanding Bayesian, devoting a section (16.4) of his book to pre-
and post-data considerations, states (p. 500): “As we have stressed repeatedly, virtually
all real problems of scientific inference are concerned with post-data questions.”
The crucial and rather fundamental issue therefore becomes how far-reaching the con-
clusions of each of these styles of inference are. To pin down the differences, Barnett
(1999: 192) gives a nice and important example:
On the one hand, the procedure of using the sample mean (or some other
measure) to estimate µ could be assessed in terms of how well we expect it
to behave; that is, in the light of different possible sets of data that might
be encountered. It will have some average characteristics that express the
precision we initially expect, i.e. before we take our data [. . .]
The alternative concept of final precision aims to express the precision of
an inference in the specific situation we are studying. Thus, if we actually
take our sample and find x¯ = 29.8, how are we to answer the question ‘how
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close is 29.8 to µ’ ? This is a most pertinent question to ask - some might
claim that it is the supreme consideration.
Now, within the Frequentist framework, the answer is rather disappointing. All we
know is that “the interval [. . .] covers the true value of µ with frequency 95% in a
long series of independent repetitions [. . .]”. Within the Bayesian framework, Barnett’s
question can be answered, since it assumes a prior distribution on the parameter space
and uses x¯ = 29.8 to calculate a posterior distribution about µ.
Because of its crucial dependence on the process generating the data the following
phenomenon is also inevitable in the Frequentist framework: Suppose a scientist applies
a standard I.Q. test and finds a value of 160 in a certain person. Since the distribution
of I.Q. values is known, one can easily give a confidence interval around the observed
value. However, suppose “on the day the score x¯ = 160 was reported, our test-grading
machine was malfunctioning. Any score x¯ below 100 was reported as 100. The machine
functioned perfectly for scores x¯ above 100” (Efron 1978: 236f). Although the observed
value is well above the area where recording errors occured, this new bit of information
on the process of data generation alters the confidence interval. Efron concludes: “it is
disturbing that any change at all is necessary. [We received] no new information about
the score actually reported, or about I.Q.’s in general. It only concerned something bad
that might have happened but didn’t.” However, he adds: “Bayesian methods are free
from this defect; the inferences they produce depend only on the data value x¯ actually
observed, since Bayesian averages [. . .] are conditional on the observed x¯.”
It is also quite typical that the Frequentist school needs to reframe straightforward
questions. Instead of answering them directly, it considers a similar situation or creates
a suitable concept within its own frame of mind. In Barnett’s example an orthodox
statistician would almost surely bring up the prominent notion of unbiased estimation.
In Frequentist terms an estimator is a function of the data and some estimator U
of µ is called unbiased if EU = µ. How, then, can Pearl (2009: 332) complain that
“[. . .] one would be extremely hard pressed to find a statistics textbook [. . .] containing
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a mathematical proof that randomization indeed produces unbiased estimates of the
quantities we wish estimated [. . .]”?
The reason is not hard to find: To him, “unbiased” means that all kinds of system-
atic error are excluded. Quite similarly, the centre for evidence-based medicine at the
university of Oxford defines “Bias: Any tendency to influence the results of a trial
(or their interpretation) other than the experimental intervention.” [Footnote: See
www.cebm.net/glossary.] Of course, such a claim is much more difficult to prove than
EX¯ = µ. It is quite telling that Pearl needs a whole section (6) to illuminate these
issues within his elaborated formal framework of causal graphs, while Jaynes (2003)
has to denote a section (17.2) to the well-known defects of the rather crude classical
concept, championed by Neyman. [Footnote: For example, if EV = σ, i.e. if V is an
unbiased estimator of σ in the restricted traditional sense, V 2 is a biased estimator
of σ2 (and vice versa). Therefore, early on, Fisher (1973: 146) wished that these con-
siderations would “have eliminated such criteria as the estimate should be ‘unbiased’
[. . .]”]
He further explains that “orthodoxians put such exaggerated emphasis on bias” due to
a “a psychosematic trap of their own making. When we call the quantity [EU −µ] the
‘bias’, that makes it sound like something awfully reprehensible, which we must get
rid of at all costs [. . .] Frequentist statisticians adopted the simple device of inventing
virtuous-sounding terms (like unbiased, efficient, uniformly most powerful, admissible,
robust) to describe their own procedures [. . .]” (Jaynes 2003: 508, 514)
Similarly, “validity” seems to be exactly what we need. However, randomization only
guarantees that a test of significance is valid in a rather narrow, technical sense (for
more details see the next section). Overlooking the fact that here, “valid” is associated
with a restricted meaning, we are deceiving ourselves. Even more so, since randomisa-
tion provokes imbalances, thus evoking alternative explanations that threaten internal
validity. Jaynes (ibid.) concludes: “This is just the price one pays for choosing a techni-
cal terminology that carries an emotional load, implying value judgements; orthodoxy
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falls constantly into this tactical error [. . .] Today these emotionally loaded terms are
only retarding progress and doing a disservice to science.”
Hence, despite a “valid” framework and mathematically sound conclusions a (purely)
Frequentist train of thought may easily miss its target or might even go astray. After
decades of Frequentist - Bayesian comparisons like the above, it has become obvious
that in many important situations the numerical results of Frequentist and Bayesian
arguments (almost) coincide. However, the two approaches are conceptually completely
different, and it also has become apparent that simple calculations within the sampling
framework lead to reasonable answers to post-data questions only because of “lucky”
coincidences (e.g. the existence of sufficient statistics for the normal distribution). Of
course, in general, such symmetries do not exist, and pre-data results cannot be trans-
ferred to post-data situations. In particular, purely Frequentist arguments fail if the
sampling distribution does not belong to the “exponential family”, if there are sev-
eral nuisance parameters, if there is important prior information, or if the number of
parameters is much larger than the number of observations (p≫ n).
It is also no coincidence, but sheer necessity, that a narrow formal line of argument
needs to be supplemented with much intuition and heuristics. So, on the one hand, an
orthodox author may claim that “randomization, instrumental variables, and so forth
have clear statistical definitions”; yet, on the other hand, he has to concede at once that
“there is a long tradition of informal - but systematic and successful - causal inference
in the medical sciences” (see Pearl (2009: 387), my emphasis).
8 Random allocation
In the Frequentist vein
randomization in design [. . .] is supposed to provide the grounds for re-
placing uncertainty about the possible effects of nuisance factors with a
probability statement about error” (Seidenfeld (1979: 214), my emphasis).
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In the light of the above it is straightforward to ask if this “reframing strategy” hits its
target. Of course, it should come as no surprise that many, if not most, Bayesians have
questioned this. For example, towards the end of his article Basu (1980: 582) writes
quite categorically: “The randomization exercise cannot generate any information on
its own. The outcome of the exercise is an ancillary statistic. Fisher advised us to
hold the ancillary statistic fixed, did he not?” Basing our inferences on the distribution
randomization creates seems to be the very reverse.
More recently, philosophers closer to the Bayesian persuation have gained ground
(Howson and Urbach 2006), and Worrall (2007) explained “why there is no cause to
randomize.” Yet even by the 1970s, members of the classical school noted that, upon
using randomization and the distribution it entails, we are dealing with “the simplest
hypothesis, that our treatment [. . .] has absolutely no effect in any instance”, and
that “under this very tight hypothesis this calculation is obviously logically sound”
(Brillinger et al. 1978: my emphasis). Here is a similar, contemporary criticism from
an outstanding scientist:
[. . .] even under ideal conditions, unaided randomization cannot answer
some very basic questions such as what fraction of a population benefits
from a program [. . .] Randomization is not an effective procedure for iden-
tifying median gains, or the distribution of gains, under general conditions
[. . .] By focusing exclusively on mean outcomes, the statistical literature
converts a metaphor for outcome selection - randomization - into an ideal
[. . .] (Heckman 2005: 146, 21, emphasis in the original).
In more general terms he (pp. 48, 145, 86) complains:
The absence of explicit models is a prominent feature of the statistical treat-
ment effect literature “[. . .] a large statistical community implicitly appeal
to a variety of conventions rather than presenting rigorous models and as-
sumptions [. . .] Statistical causal models, in their current state, are not fully
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articulated models. Crucial assumptions about sources of randomness are
kept implicit.
As for the sources of randomness, one should at least distinguish between natural
variation and artificially introduced variability. A straightforward question then surely
is, how inferences based on the “man-made” portion bear on the “natural” part. To
this end, Basu (1980: 579ff) compares a scientist, following the logic we described in
Section 1 and a statistician who counts on randomization. Let us eavesdrop on their
conversation:
Statistician:Observe that the randomization test argument does not depend
on any probabilistic assumptions. The randomization probabilities are fully
understood and completely under control.
Scientist: I do not understand the relevance of the randomization proba-
bilities [. . .] It is relevant to know that the 30 animals have been paired
into 15 homogeneous blocks. The manner of my labeling the two animals
in the ith block [. . .] does not seem to be of much relevance. The number
m of treatment allocations of the type (t, c) seems to be of no consequence
at all. [. . .] How can the level of significance depend so largely on such an
irrelevant data characteristic as m? [. . .] I have not been asked on all the
background information that I have on the problem [. . .] I am amazed to
find that a statistical analysis of my data can be made without reference
to these relevant bits of information.
Statistician: You are trying to make a joke out of an excellent statistical
method of proven value [. . .] Your criticisms are based on an extreme ex-
ample and then on a misunderstanding of the very nature of the tests of
significance. Tests of significance do not lead to probabilities of hypotheses
[. . .] The randomization analysis of data is so simple, so free of unnecessary
assumptions that I fail to understand how anyone can raise any objection
against the method.
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Scientist: As a scientist I have been trained to put as much control into the
experimental setup as I am capable of, to balance out nuisance factors as
far as possible [. . .] I worked very hard on the project of striking a perfect
balance between the treatment and the control groups.
Statistician: Now the reference consists of only [two points] and the signif-
icance level [works out to be 1/2 or 1]. Your data is not significant at all.
Had I known about this before, I would not have touched your data with a
long pole.
Scientist (utterly flabbergasted): But my experiment was better planned
than a fully randomized experiment, was it not? With my group control
(in addition to the usual local control) I made it much harder for T =
∑
ti −
∑
ci to be large in the absence of any treatment difference.
Statistician: My good man, you must realize that your experiment is no
good [. . .] It appears that you do not have a clear understanding of the role
of randomization in statistical experiments.
Not quite surprisingly, it turns out that the scientist and the statistician are talking past
each other. While the foremost goal of the scientist is to make the groups comparable,
the statistician focuses on the randomization distribution. Moreover, the scientist asks
repeatedly to include important information, but with his inquiry falling on deaf ears,
he disputes this statistician’s analysis altogether.
Frequentists say that the crucial role of randomization, stated right at the beginning
of this discussion (see the last section), is to provide a known distribution. But is this
really so? If the result of a random allocation is extreme (e.g. all women are assigned
to T, and all men to C), everybody - Fisher included - seems to be prepared to dismiss
this realization: “It should in fairness be mentioned that, when randomization leads to
a bad-looking experiment or sample, Fisher said that the experimenter should, with
discretion and judgement, put the sample aside and draw another” (Savage 1976: 464).
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The latter concession isn’t just a minor inconvenience that may be fixed by a “gentle-
men’s agreement”. First, an informal correction is wide open to personal capriciousness:
(already) “bad-looking” to you may be (still) “fine-looking” to me. Second, what’s the
randomization distribution actually used when dismissing some samples? A vague se-
lection procedure will inevitably lead to a badly defined distribution. Third, why reject
certain samples at all? If the crucial feature of randomization is to provide a distribu-
tion (on which all further “valid” inference is based), one should not give away this
advantage unhesitantly. At the very least, it is inconsistent to praise the argument of
the known framework in theoretical work, and to turn a blind eye to it in practice.
As a matter of fact, in applications, the exact permutation distribution created by
some particular randomization process plays a rather subordinate role. Much more
frequently, randomization is used as a rationale for common statistical procedures.
Here is one of these heuristics: Randomization guarantees independence and if many
small uncorrelated (and also often unknown) factors contribute to the distribution of
some observable variableX , this distribution should be normal - at least approximately,
if n is not too small. Therefore, in a statistical experiment, it seems to be justified to
compare X¯T and X¯C , using these means and the sample variance as estimators of their
corresponding population parameters - which is nothing but a verbal description of
the t-test (Gosset 1908). Thus, this test’s rationale is supported by randomization.
However, it may be noted that Student’s famous test was introduced much earlier and
worked quite well without randomization’s assistance.
Let us look at this from a different angle. A statistical test - or any analytical proce-
dure for that matter - is an algorithm, transferring some numerical input into a certain
output which, in the simplest case, is just a single number. From a Frequentist point of
view, there are two very different kinds of input: experimental and non-experimental
data. However, from a look at the data at hand one cannot tell if they stem from
a proper statistical experiment or not. [Footnote: That’s the main reason why Pearl
(2009) classifies randomization as a causal and not as a statistical concept.] The for-
mal test does not distinguish either: Given the same data it yields exactly the same
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output. The crucial difference lies in the interpretation of the numerical result. Since
randomization treated all variables (known and unknown) alike, the analytical pro-
cedure “catches” them all and their effect shows up in the output. For example, a
confidence interval, so the story goes, gives a quantitative estimate of all of the vari-
ables’ impact. One can thus numerically assess how strong this influence is, and has, in
a sense, achieved explicit quantitative control. In particular, if the combined influence
of all nuisance factors (Seidenfeld’s “probability statement about error‘”) is numeri-
cally small, one may safely conclude that a substantial difference between T and C
must be due to the experimental intervention. In a nutshell, owing to randomization, a
statistical experiment gives a “valid” result in the sense that it allows for far-reaching,
in particular causal, conclusions. Seen this way, randomization is sufficient for a causal
conclusion, and some are convinced that it is also necessary (Holland’s “no causation
without manipulation”, see Section 10).
Note, however, that the crucial part of the above argument is informal in a rather
principled way. It is suspicious that in an experimental, as well as in a similar non-
experimental situation, the formal machinery, i.e. the data at hand, the explicit analyt-
ical procedure (e.g. a t-test), and the final numerical result may be identical. It is just
the narrative prior to the data that makes such a tremendous difference in the end.
Since verbal, non-mathematical arguments have a certain power of persuasion which is
certainly weaker than a crisp formal derivation or a strict mathematical proof, it seems
to be no coincidence that opinion on this matter has remained divided. Followers of
Fisher believed in his intuition and trusted randomization, critics did not. And since,
sociologically speaking, the Frequentist school dominated the field for decades, so did
randomization.
Today, informal reasoning is a bit out of fashion. First, at least in the natural sciences,
mathematical arguments are more important than verbal considerations. Typically,
the thrust of an argument consists of formulas and their implications, with words of
explanation surrounding the formal core. Second, we have learnt that seemingly very
convincing verbal arguments can be wrong. In particular, increased formal precision has
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often corrected intuition and “obvious” time-honored conclusions. Hence, the nucleus
of most contemporary theories has become mathematical. Causality is no exception
to that rule. First, in the last twenty years or so causal networks and causal calculus
have formalized this field. Second, as was to be expected, this increased precision
straightforwardly demonstrated that certain “reasonable” conventions do not work as
expected (see Pearl (2009), in particular Chapter 6 and p. 341). It is not necessary
to delve deeply into these matters, since it suffices to look at Savage’s example again.
He claims qualitatively, and the above models corroborate this quantitatively, that no
matter how one splits a heterogenous group into two, the latter groups will always
be systematically different. Randomization does not help: If you assign randomly and
detect a large effect in the end, your experimental intervention or the initial difference
between T and C may have caused it. All “valid” inferential statistics cannot exclude
the straightforward second explanation; it’s the initial comparability of the groups that
is decisive for a sound causal conclusion.
The phrase “if n is not too small” is also a verbal argument, implicitly appealing to the
central limit theorem. The same with groups created by random assignment: Owing to
the latter theorem they tend to become similar. The informal assurance, affirming that
this happens fast, ranks among the most prominent conventions of traditional statistics.
However, explicit numerical models, e.g. those presented in this contribution, underline
that our intuition needs to be corrected. Precise formal arguments - in particular rather
straightforward calculations - show that fluctuations cannot be dismissed easily, even
if n is large.
Apart from the rather explicit rhetoric of a “valid framework”, there is also always the
implicit logic of the experiment around. Thus, although the received theory emphasizes
that “actual balance has nothing to do with validity of statistical inference; it is an
issue of efficiency only” (Senn 1994: 227); in practice, comparability has turned out
to be crucial. Many, if not most, of those praising randomization hurry to mention
that it promotes similar groups (see numerous quotations in this article). Nowadays,
only a small minority is basing its inferences on the known permutation distribution
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created by the process of randomization; but an overwhelming majority is checking
for comparability. Reviewers of experimental studies routinely request that authors
provide randomization checks, that is, statistical tests designed to substantiate the
equivalence of T and C. At least, in almost every article a list of covariates - with their
groupwise means and standard errors - can be found. [Footnote: It is also not much
of a surprise that the popular “propensity score” is defined as the coarsest balancing
score (Rosenbaum und Rubin 1983).]
In a nutshell, hardly anybody follows “pure Frequentist logic”. In a strict sense, there is
no logic at all, rather a certain kind of mathematical reasoning plus - since the formal
framework is restricted to sampling - a fairly large set of conventions; rigid “pure”
arguments being readily complemented by applied “flexibility.” (The latter consisting
of time-honored informal reasoning and shibboleth, but also outright concessions.)
Consequently, one finds a broad range of verbal arguments why randomization should
be employed:
In my view Fisher regarded randomization as being essential in all experi-
ments in the same way that he regarded it as being essential in telepathic
and psychophysical experiments: the estimate of error followed exactly from
the richness of the randomization. (Senn 1994: 220)
As I see it, the purpose of randomization in the design of agricultural
field experiments was to help ensure the validity of normal-theory anal-
ysis. (Hinkley 1980: 583)
Randomization tends to produce study groups comparable with respect to
known and unknown risk factors, removes investigator bias in the alloca-
tion of participants, and guarantees that statistical tests will have valid
significance levels. (Friedman et al. 1998: 61)
The first property of randomization is that it promotes comparability among
the study groups [. . .] The second property is that the act of randomization
provides a probabilistic basis for an inference from the observed results when
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considered in reference to all possible results. (Rosenberger and Lachin 2002:
7)
9 Cause and effect
The core question of a statistical experiment, in particular a clinical trial, is thus:
Does the treatment under consideration work? More specifically: Did the experimental
intervention (e.g. a new drug) cause an observed effect (e.g. that the patients in group
T lived longer than those in C)? The answer will be a straightforward yes, if alternative
explanations can be excluded, i.e. if any competing cause can be barred.
In the above chapters we considered two lines of reasoning, the first one going back to
J.S. Mill, the second one originating from R.A. Fisher’s work. In a sense, they are not
competitors. However, at the end of the day, they both should be judged according to
their contribution in establishing the desired causal connection.
The logic we have exposed in Section 1 is simple and strong: If the groups are compara-
ble at the beginning and if conscious experimentation guarantees that the intervention
remains the only systematic difference between the groups, then this intervention must
be the reason for a finally observed difference between the groups.
However, many statisticians count on randomization. They give a variety of reasons
why this technique should be used (for a sample see the end of the last section). When
they refer to Mill’s logic, it is comparability that matters. Alas, as many have noted
qualitatively (see Section 4), and as the above models demonstrate quantitatively, ran-
domization often fails in this respect. Therefore, at least in theoretical discussions, tra-
ditional statisticians refer to the “known-distribution argument” which, as we have seen
in the last section, is also rather short-legged. Finally, there is the “little-assumption
argument:”
A new eye drug was tested against an old one on 10 subjects. The drugs were
randomly assigned to both eyes of each person. In all cases the new drug
performed better than the old drug. The P-value from the observed data
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is 2−10 = 0.001, showing that what we observe is not likely due to chance
alone, or that it is very likely the new drug is better than the old one [. . .]
Such simplicity is difficult to beat. Given that a physical randomization
was actually used, very little extra assumption is needed to produce a valid
conclusion. (Pawitan 2001: 13)
Since “there’s no such thing as a free lunch” (Tukey, see Davies (2008: 195)), we
should become suspicious upon reading such textbook examples. A narrow, restricted
framework is only able to support weak conclusions. Therefore, upon reaching a strong
conclusion, one should immediately think about implicit, hidden assumptions. Be re-
minded of Heckman (2005) who says (pp. 139, 155, his emphasis):
Structural models do not ‘make strong assumptions.’ They make explicit
the assumptions required to identify parameters in any particular problem.
The treatment effect literature does not make fewer assumptions; it is much
less explicit about its assumptions [. . .] The assumptions to justify random-
ization (no randomization bias, no contamination or crossover effects [. . .])
are different and not weaker or stronger than the assumptions [econometric
models use].
[Footnote: In a table, Heckman (2005: 87) compares econometric and sta-
tistical causal models. Not surprisingly, the “range of questions answered”
by the latter is just “one focused treatment effect.”]
A second look at Pawitan’s example thus reveals that it is the hidden assumption of
comparability that carries much of the burden of evidence. It is no coincidence that an
eye drug was tested. Suppose, one had tested a liver drug instead: The same numerical
result would be almost as convincing if such a drug had been applied to twins or (very)
similar persons. However, if the liver drug had been administered to a heterogenous
set of persons or if the new drug had been given to a different biological species (mice
instead of men, say), exactly the same formal result would not be convincing at all;
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since, rather obviously, a certain discrepancy a priori may cause a remarkable difference
a posteriori.
Comparability keeps this crucial alternative explanation at bay, not randomization;
and it is our endeavour to achieve similar groups. Remember that for exactly the same
reason Savage (in Section 5.1) came to the conclusion that “it does not seem possible
to base a meaningful experiment on a small heterogenous group.” Wang (1993: 52, 70,
emphasis in the original) adds:
In statistics, the purpose of randomization is to achieve homogeneity in the
sample units [. . .] it should be spelled out that stability and homogeneity
are the foundation of the statistical solution, not the other way around.
For instance, in a clinical trial, applications of a randomized study to new
patients rely on both the stability and homogeneity assumptions of our
biological systems.
Given this point of view, it turns out that minimization (see Section 3) is not just
some supplementary technique to improve efficiency. Rather, it is a straightforward
and elaborate device to enhance comparability, i.e. to consciously construct similar
groups. [Footnote: For the influence of unknown factors see Section 6.]
10 A broader perspective
In the 20th century, R.A. Fisher (1890-1962) was the most prominent statistician. How-
ever, while his early work on mathematical statistics is highly respected in all quarters,
hardly anybody relies on his later ideas, in particular fiducial inference (Savage 1976).
Randomization lies in between, and, quite fittingly, public opinion on this formal tech-
nique has been divided. Like the Bayesians, Fisher (1973) was looking for a general
inductive logic. However, “Fisher’s main tactic was to logically reduce a given inference
problem [. . .] to a simple form where everyone should agree that the answer is obvious
[. . .] Fisher’s inductive logic might be called a theory of types, in which problems are
reduced to a small catalogue of obvious situations (Efron 1998: 97).”
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Some fifty years after his death it can safely be said that this approach did not succeed.
It turned out that a few remarkable concepts, united in a rather narrow mathematical
framework, and augmented by a set of conventions could not reduce the complexity of
the real world to a few prototype examples. Leaving out a crucial piece of probability
theory, Fisher’s strategy was able to give a collection of ad hoc devices, working on
many special occasions; but as a whole “Frequentist theory is shot full of contradictions
[. . .]” (Efron 2001). Basu (1988) and others who doggedly tried to rectify Fisher’s ideas,
soon became Bayesians. Jaynes (2003: 494ff) explains why:
[. . .] Jeffreys was able to bypass Fisher’s calculations and derive those pa-
rameter estimates in a few lines of the most elementary algebra [. . .] Fisher’s
difficult calculations calling for all that space intuition [. . .] were quite un-
necessary for the actual conduct of inference. [. . .] Harold Jeffreys (1939)
was able to derive all the same results far more easily, by direct use of
probability theory as logic, and this automatically yielded additional in-
formation about the range of validity of the results and how to generalize
them, that Fisher never did obtain.
What may thus be said about randomization? How does Fisher’s construction of a
know distribution perform relative to the classical logic of experimentation?
First, most scientists check for comparability, i.e. they follow Mill’s argument. Or, as
Frequentist statisticians put it: they all seem to have misunderstood randomization.
Second, within statistics, Bayesians have always disputed the orthodox point of view,
and during the last decades the latter has become less popular.
Third, even within orthodox statistics, there is no consensus about how to analyze ran-
domized data. Nobody, not even Fisher, relies on “pure randomization,” in particular
the distribution it generates. It is quite striking that only a minority, perfectly in line
with the received position, advices not to adjust data at all. Freedman (2008b: 180f,
191) argues thus:
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Regression adjustments are often made to experimental data. Since ran-
domization does not justify the models, almost anything can happen [. . .]
The reason for the breakdown is not hard to find: randomization does not
justify the assumptions behind the OLS model [. . .] The simulations, like
the analytic results, indicate a wide range of possible behavior. For instance,
adjustment may help or hurt.
[Footnote: For similar comments see Freedman (2008a), Pearl (2009: 340),
and Bookstein (2014: 250ff).]
Yet a majority, like Rosenbaum (2002), Rosenberger and Lachin (2002), Shadish et al.
(2002), or Tu et al. (2000), opts for an “adjustment of treatment effect for covariates
in clinical trials.” The latter authors explain why (p. 511):
Covariates that affect the outcome of a disease are often incorporated into
the design and analysis of clinical trials. This serves two main purposes: 1.
To improve the credibility of the trial results by demonstrating that any
observed treatment effect is not accounted for by an imbalance in patient
characteristics, and 2. To improve statistical efficiency.
[Footnote: Notice that, again, the authors readily refer to balance, but not to the
“known-distribution argument”.]
How strong is the evidence produced by a randomized controlled trial (RCT)? Vis-a`-vis
the rather anecdotal and qualitative research that preceded today’s RCTs, the latter
surely constituted real progress. Strict design and standardized analysis has raised the
level and has fostered consensus among researchers. However, many classical experi-
ments in the natural sciences are deterministic and have an even better reputation. If
in doubt, physicists do not randomize, but replicate. Fisher (1936: 58, my emphasis)
gave similar advice:
[. . . ] no one doubts, in practice, that the probability of being led to an
erroneous conclusion by the chances of sampling only, can, by repetition
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[. . .] of the sample, be made so small that the reality of the difference must
be regarded as convincingly demonstrated.
Alas, a large number of important biomedical findings (RCTs included) failed this
examination and turned out to be non-replicable (Ioannidis 2005, Prinz et al. 2011,
Begley and Ellis 2012), so that the National Institute of Health (2013) was forced to
launch the “Replication of Key Clinical Trials Initiative” [Footnote: Also see the editors of Nature
(2013)]. The same with experimental psychology which has relied on (small) random-
ized trials for decades. Now, it is lamenting a “replicability crisis” that has proved to
be so severe that an unprecedented “reproducibility project” needed to be launched
(Carpenter 2012, Pashler and Wagenmakers 2012). [Footnote: For further similar ini-
tiatives see http://validation.scienceexchange.com]
The logic of Section 1 offers a straightforward explanation to this unpleasant state of af-
fairs. Given (almost) equal initial conditions, the same boundary conditions thereafter,
and a well-defined experimental intervention, an effect once observed must reoccur.
That’s how classical experiments work, which reliably and thus repeatedly hit their
target. During the experiment, a controlled environment keeps disturbing factors at
bay. Thus, if an effect cannot be replicated, the constructional flaw should be looked
for at the very beginning of the endeavour. At this point, it is conspicuous that today’s
studies do not focus explicitly on the crucial idea of comparability. With other issues
- possibly rather irrelevant or even misleading - being at least as important, initial
imbalances are the rule and not the exception. At the very least, with randomization,
the starting point of researcher 2, trying to repeat the result of researcher 1, will al-
ways differ from the latter’s point of origin. Therefore, if an effect cannot be replicated,
this may well be due to the additional variability introduced by randomization, yield-
ing unequal initial conditions, and “drowning” the interesting phenomenon in a sea of
random fluctuation.
Chance has a Janus face. The idea that many (the more the better), small and rather
uncorrelated random influences sum up to a “mild” distribution originated in the 19th
century, culminating in the famous central limit theorem on which much of classical
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statistics is built. However, this was not the end of the story. Studying complex systems,
physicists soon encountered “wild” distributions, in particular power laws (Sornette
2006: 104). It is well within this newer set of ideas that a single random event may have a
major impact that cannot be neglected (e.g. the energy released by a particularly strong
earthquake or the area devastated by a single large flood). Quite fittingly, Gumbel said
(see E´rdi (2008: 339)):
It seems that rivers know the theory. It only remains to convince the engi-
neers of the validity of this analysis.
The fact that the process of randomization can produce a major fluctuation, i.e. a pro-
nounced imbalance in a covariate (and thereby between T and C), exerting a tremen-
dous influence on the final result of an RCT is in line with this more recent portrait of
chance.
Randomization has tremendous prestige in orthodox statistics, downgrading all designs
without a random element to quasi-experiments. One even distinguishes thoroughly
between truly random allocation and “haphazard assignment, that is, a procedure that
is not formally random but has no obvious bias” (Shadish et al. 2002: 302). Honoring
thus the classical philosophical distinction between “deterministic” and “random‘”, one
readily neglects the fact that modern dynamical systems theory sees a continuum of
increasing complexity between perfect (deterministic) order and “randomness [which]
can be thought of as an extreme form of chaos” (Elston und Glasbey 1990: 340).
With the technique, or rather dogma, of randomization at its heart, Fisher’s conception
of experiments could even develop into a “cult of the single study” (Nelder 1999: 262),
and catch phrases highlighting randomization’s outstanding role - e.g. “no causation
without manipulation” (Holland 1986) - became increasingly popular. However, this
determined point of view has also blocked progress and innovative solutions have been
developed elsewhere.
In particular, the story of causation may be told as a “tale of statistical agony” (Pearl
2009). Econometrist Heckman (2005: 5, 147) adds:
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Blind empiricism unguided by a theoretical framework for interpreting facts
leads nowhere [. . .] Holland claims that there can be no causal effect of gen-
der on earnings. Why? Because we cannot randomly assign gender. This
confused statement conflates the act of definition of the causal effect [. . .]
with empirical difficulties in estimating it [. . .] This type of reasoning is
prevalent in statistics [. . .] Since randomization is used to define the pa-
rameters of interest, this practice sometimes leads to the confusion that
randomization is the only way - or at least the best way - to identify causal
parameters from real data.
Heckman earned a nobel prize for his contributions in 2000. Epidemiology, following the
Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service (1964), but
not Fisher (1959), made its way to causal graphs. On the one hand, this formalization
straightforwardly gave crucial concepts a sound basis, on the other hand quite a few
received “reasonable” practices turned out to be dubious (Pearl 2009).
In a more positive vein, computer scientist Rissanen (2007) has shown how Fisher’s
finest ideas may be reformulated and extended within a modern, fine-tuned mathe-
matical framework (Li und Vita´nyi 2008). In Rissannen’s work one finds a logically
sound and general unifying theory of hypothesis testing, estimation and modeling;
yet there is no link to randomization. Li and Vita´nyi even include a chapter (5.5) on
“nonprobabilistic statistics”. In this contemporary theory the crucial concept turns
out to be Kolmogorov complexity, allowing to express the idea that a regular se-
quence r (e.g. “1,0” repeated 13 times) is less complex than a sequence like s =
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) in a mathematically strict way.
[Footnote: s can be found in Li und Vita´nyi (2008: 48).] It also turns out that stochastic
processes typically produce complex sequences. However, contrary to the fundamental
distinction (deterministic vs. random) mentioned above, given a certain sequence like
s, it is not possible to tell whether the process that generated s was systematic or not.
s could be the output of a “(pseudo-)random number generator”, i.e. a deterministic
algorithm designed to produce chaotic output, or of a truly random mechanism. [Foot-
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note: Whatever that is. For example, strictly speaking, coin tossing - being a part of
classical physics - is not.]
Hence, interpreting s as a particular assignment of units to groups (1→ T , and 0→ C,
say), the above fundamental distinction between “‘haphazard” and “random” assign-
ment processes seems to be largely overdrawn, some might even question if it is relevant
at all. However, it is difficult to deny that the (non-)regularity of the concrete mapping
matters. Just compare r to s: Since r invites a straightforward alternative explanation,
most people would prefer s. In today’s terminology, Fisher could have been looking for
maximally complex sequences, i.e. allocations without any regularity. In his time, a sim-
ple stochastic process typically yielding an “irregular” sequence was a straightforward
and convenient solution to this problem.
All in all, Fisher’s idea of randomization is still alive. However, at large, it looks more
like a remarkable solitaire from a heroic past than like the indispensable key to statis-
tic’s future. At first sight, its career has been remarkable, but, make no mistake, it is a
sign of crisis if a technique attains the status of a doctrine. This gives those questioning
it a hard time. Like all heretics in history, they have received an unfair amount of crit-
icism (just look up the reactions to Howson and Urbach (2006), 1st ed. 1986). Not too
long ago, it sufficed to combine the evidence of several studies in a systematic way to
be met with scorn and derision. (See, for example, Eysenck (1978) on meta-analysis.)
11 Conclusion: Good experimental practice
In the face of all the issues we have discussed, Fisher’s claim that “[randomization]
relieves the experimenter from the anxiety of considering and estimating the magnitude
of the innumerable causes by which the data may be disturbed” seems to be close to
wishful thinking. In particular, quantitative arguments and formal theories show that
quite the contrary is true. Since random assignment is no philosopher’s stone, almost
effortlessly lifting experimental procedures in the medical and social sciences to the
level of classical experiments in the natural sciences, it has lulled many researchers
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into a false sense of security, thereby degenerating the most successful information
science (Efron 2001) into a mindless ritual (Gigerenzer 2004). Why has it taken so long
to address the question explicitly? A number of reasons spring to mind:
• Randomization considerably reduces the operating expense of experimentation
and makes the analysis of data simple, producing results that seem to be far-
reaching. Although this sounds too good to be true, we are rather inclined to
accept such a “favourable” procedure, in particular, when it is put forward by an
authority. To admit that there is no such thing as a free lunch, that one has to
work hard in order to get (closer to) comparability, is unpleasant news that we
tend to avoid.
• Randomization addresses the fundamental problem of controlling unknown nui-
sance factors. In particular, it is impartial and does not favour or discriminate
against any particular variable. This seems to outweigh the obvious disadvantage
of randomization, i.e., known factors are less balanced than they would be if one
used some non-randomized procedure, such as minimization.
• Randomization fits well into the dominant Frequentist framework. Moreover, as
the fundamental difference between random quantities and their realizations is
rather blurred in traditional statistics, one easily confuses the two. Yet, as the
above models and quotations show, the difference between process and realization
is crucial: Although a random allocation mechanism is independent of any other
variable, its effect, a particular allocation of units to groups, can be considerably
out of balance.
With respect to the last point it is often said that “randomization equates the groups
on expectation” (e.g. Morgan und Winship (2007: 40, 82), Shadish et al. (2002: 250)).
The latter authors explain: “In any given experiment, observed pretest means will differ
due to luck [. . .] But we can expect that participants will be equal over conditions in
the long run over many randomized experiments.”
47
What is wrong with this argument? First, it conflates the single experiment being
conducted and analyzed with a hypothetical series of experiments. Second, it therefore
downplays the fundamental problem pointed out in Section 1 and emphasized by many
authors (see Section 4): In each and every experiment there is a convincing alternative
explanation if the groups differ from the outset. Third, these substantial objections do
not just vanish “in the long run”. Rather, if each study can be seriously challenged,
the whole of the evidence may remain rather shaky. Fourthly, although it is certainly
correct that replicated, randomized experiments align the set of all those treated with
the set of all those not treated (“in expectation”), this simply does not imply that such
a symmetry property also holds in the single experiment. Typically, quite the reverse
is true (see Section 5). Finally, the argument praises randomization where credit ought
to be given to replication.
Coming back to the main theme of this contribution, it may be said that chance in the
guise of randomization by and large supports comparability. However, since the former
is blind with respect to concrete factors and relevant interactions that may be present, it
needs a large number of experimental units to do so. The intuition behind this result is
easy to grasp: Without knowledge of the subject-matter, randomization has to protect
against every conceivable nuisance factor. Such a kind of unsystematic protection is
provided by number and builds up slowly. Thus, a huge number of randomly allocated
subjects is needed to shield against a moderate number of potential confounders. And,
of course, no finite procedure such as the flip of a coin is able to control for an infinite
number of nuisance variables.
Therefore, it seems much more advisable to use background knowledge in order to
minimize the difference between groups with respect to known factors or specific threats
to experimental validity. As of today, minimization operationalizes this idea best. At
the end of such a conscious construction process, randomization finds its proper place.
Only if no reliable context information exists is unrestricted randomization the method
of choice. It must be clear, however, that it is a weak guard against confounding, yet
the only one available in such inconvenient situations.
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All in all, the above analysis strongly recommends traditional experimentation, thor-
oughly selecting, balancing and controlling factors and subjects with respect to known
relevant variables, thereby using broader context information - i.e., substantial scientific
knowledge. I agree with Penston (2003: 76f) who says:
[. . .] it is the existence of sound background theory which is crucial for the
success of science. It is the framework against which observations are made,
it allows strict definition of the items involved, it is the source of informa-
tion about possible relevant variables and allows for the identification of
homogeneous reference classes that ensure regularity and, hence, reliable
causal inference.
Cumulative science is the result of a successful series of such experiments - each of
them focusing on the crucial ingredients, like precise research questions, convincing
operationalizations, explicit control, quantitative measures of effect, and - last but not
least - comparability.
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